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OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
Income Tax: Losing Twice on the Sale of a
Personal Residence
Imagine this scenario: Your boss calls you into his office. The company
has decided to move the research and development division to Dallas. To
keep your job, you must relocate and sell your new home. Your company has
an excellent employee relocation program. The personnel department has ex-
plained that you will be reimbursed for all moving expenses if you turn in
completed receipts. The relocation program covers the costs of moving your
personal belongings, transporting your family to the new residence, a couple
of trips to Dallas to search for a new home, and thirty days' temporary ac-
commodations until your new residence is ready. According to the personnel
department memo you received, you must report these reimbursements for
income tax purposes, but there is a corresponding deduction that will allow
you to offset the entire amount of the reimbursement.'
Your actual moving expenses, however, are the least of your worries.
You have been told to report for work in Dallas in one month. You will be
fortunate to sell your home in sixty days and then only at a price several
thousand dollars less than your acquisition cost. Again, you are in luck.
Your employer also has a home guarantee program. Under this program,
your employer will guarantee that you receive no less than the appraised
value of your home. Not surprisingly, because the home is new, the appraised
value is the same as your acquisition cost.
You receive one offer to purchase your home-for $5,000 less than its
appraised value. The company approves this price, so you sell and receive
your reimbursement. You use the sale proceeds and reimbursement to pur-
chase a comparable home in Dallas. When you file your income tax return
the following year, you report no income on the sale of your home; your ac-
countant has told you that if you buy a new home for more than the sale
price of your old home within 18 months of that sale, you need report no
gain on the sale.
2
Six months later it arrives-the tax deficiency notice. Inside the
envelope is a short, uninformative letter. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
has determined that you failed to report $5,000 in compensation from your
employer. The IRS has characterized the reimbursement for the loss on the
sale of your home (appraised value/acquisition cost minus sale price) as
employer compensation for your services.
I.R.C. § 217 is an express grant of deductibility status to certain moving expenses (in-
cluding, but riot limited to, those listed in the text sentence) conditioned upon the employee
meeting the specific criteria of subsection (c). Those criteria are (1) that his new principal place
of work be at least 35 miles farther from his former residence than was his former principal
place of work, or if he had no former principal place of work, be at least 35 miles from his
former residence, and (2) that he be a fulltime employee at that location for 39 weeks of the next
12 months following the move.
I I.R.C. § 1034 permits the rollover of gain on the sale of a personal residence if the
purchase of the second home is within 18 months of the sale of the first home.
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The national character of many United States companies makes the
described scenario a common and critical problem for those employees who
realize no improvement in their financial position as a result of a relocation.
Because the reimbursement from the employer is usually invested in the next
home, taxpayers must often liquidate other assets (or borrow) to satisfy the
tax deficiency. That course is particularly unpleasant to the employee who
sees himself as no better off by the relocation. This note will track the history
of the judicial treatment of such reimbursements, analyze the arguments of-
fered in support of nontaxation or deferral of income recognition on the
reimbursement, examine the nontax effects of the rule, and propose changes
that could allay the Service's true concern and at the same time restore
equitable treatment of the taxpayer.
Congressional Authority for the Characterization
With the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code, 3 Congress granted
the Internal Revenue Service broad discretion to define gross income.' Under
the previous Code, 5 the definition of gross income included gains, profits,
and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal ser-
vices of whatever kind and in any form paid. 6 Under the 1954 Code, gross in-
come is defined as all income from whatever source. 7 The Service has used
this vague definition plus other Code sections to reach transfers of property
heretofore untaxed.8 Only since the enactment of the 1954 Code has a reim-
bursement received by an employee from his employer for the loss sustained
on the sale of a personal residence incident to an employer-requested reloca-
tion been taxed. 9
To tax this reimbursement, the Service has stretched the umbrella
language of section 61(a) to its outer limits. The Service has not relied upon
congressional intent; there is none regarding a home sale loss reimbursement.
Congress has enacted Code sections to govern the tax treatment of meals and
lodging received by an employee from his employer,' 0 employer transfers of
noncash property to employees," employees' qualified pension, profit-
sharing, and stock bonus plans,' 2 employee death benefits,' 3 and employee
moving expenses." However, Congress has failed to provide employers and
Act of Aug. 16, 1954, Pub. L. No. 591.
I.R.C. § 61(a).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, 53 Stat. 47.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1 § 22(a), 53 Stat. 47 (now I.R.C. § 61(a)).
7 I.R.C. § 61(a).
I See I.R.C. § 83, Property Transferred in Connection With Performance of Services.
The language of this section leaves much room for Service discretion, but as yet no court has
construed the language to reach an employer's reimbursement to an employee for home sale loss.
Harris W. Bradley, 39 T.C. 652, aff'd 324 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1963).
I.R.C. § 119.
" I.R.C. § 83.
12 I.R.C. § 401.
13 I.R.C. § 101(b).
I' I.R.C. § 217.
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employees guidance as to the taxability of reimbursements for home sale
losses incident to an employer-requested relocation.
Before 1954, an employer's payment to an employee for loss sustained
on the sale of a personal residence was treated as part of the amount realized
from the sale of the home."s After 1954, the courts reevaluated this position
in light of decisions construing the statutory definition of income 16 and aban-
doned the earlier characterization.' The most recent decision on this issue is
the broadest in disallowing avoidance of immediate taxation. A sale of the
residence to the employer was treated as illusory, while the subsequent sale
by the employer to a disinterested third party was attributed to the
employee. I"
Petitioners objecting to this tax treatment have offered myriad
arguments," all of which have been rejected. "° The Service has consistently
maintained that section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code allows the taxation
of such reimbursements. According to the Service, the employer's motive in
making these payments is to provide an incentive to the employee and
therefore compensate him for future performance. 2' In only one case has the
Tax Court pierced the Service's superficial arguments and dealt with the real
concern that a loosening of the rule will encourage employers to conceal
bonuses, dividends, and salary increases in the guise of a nontaxable
transfer.
2 "
Such a concern is arguably valid, although statutory safeguards or
regulations could establish the parameters of a nontaxable reimbursement.
However, adherence to the rule as it now stands has deleterious effects on
society as a whole that transcend the mere frustration of the affected tax-
payer.
The Judicial History
In 1947 the Tax Court heard its first case, Otto Sorg Schairer,21
concerning an employee's reimbursement for loss sustained on the sale of his
" Otto Sorg Schairer, 9 T.C. 549 (1947).
6 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Commissioner v. LoBue, 351
U.S. 243 (1956). It seems anomalous that the Service would rely upon cases in which the true
issue was whether a transfer was a gift or compensation when other cases construing the Code
definition of income would seem more appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Drescher, 179
F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950).
" Harris W. Bradley, 39 T.C. 652, aff'd 324 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1963).
" Thomas L. Karsten, 44 T.C.M. (P-H), 75, 202, at 852 (1975).
," A taxpayer who challenges an Internal Revenue Service assessment is, unless he can
find a specific Code exception, the petitioner in any proceeding and he bears the burden of pro-
duction and persuasion. See section 534 for a specific exception.
20 Lull v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 841, 847 (1969), aff'd 434 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1970);
Ritter v. United States, 393 F.2d 823, 831 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 844 (1968); Harris W.
Bradley, 39 T.C. 652, 655 (1963).
21 Otto Sorg Schairer, 9 T.C. 549 (1947).
22 Id.
11 Id. at :550.
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personal residence as a result of an employer-requested relocation. The peti-
tioner, a vice-president of RCA,24 was required to move in order to be closer
to a newly constructed laboratory. Schairer conformed to his employer's
wishes after his superior assured him that RCA would reimburse him for any
loss resulting from the sale of his home.2" The Tax Court held that the pro-
mise of reimbursement was not intended as a promise of compensation for
services.27 Subsequent to an arm's-length sale by Schairer, RCA reimbursed
him the difference between the value of the home and the sale price.
2
8
Schairer did not report the payment as income and RCA entered the payment
on its own books as "sundry Expenses" .29 The Service, relying on the
statutory definition of gross income, 30 assessed a deficiency.3' The court re-
jected the Service's argument and held that the reimbursement was part of
the amount realized on the sale of the home.32 Because the total amount
realized did not exceed Schairer's cost basis in the home, it was characterized
as capital recovered and not taxable gain.
3
1
The definition of income was broadened by the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954.1' The United States Supreme Court, in decisions construing this
definition, held that "income" included any economic or financial benefit
conferred on an employee as compensation." The Service used these deci-
sions to obtain a reversal of the Schairer rule and then an expansion of the
reversal's impact. 6
In 1963 the Tax Court rejected Schairer in Harris W. Bradley. 7 The
petitioner, Bradley, relocated to accept new employment .3 Two months after
Bradley commenced his new employment, his employer guaranteed that
Bradley would receive an amount, not necessarily an average, between two
appraisals on the home. 39 When the home was sold, the proceeds were less
than the guarantee, so the employer made up the difference."' The Tax Court
24 Id. at 551.
2s Id.
11 Id. at 552.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 553.
29 Id.
10 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 22(a), 53 Stat. 47 (now I.R.C. § 61(a)).
1, Otto Sorg Schairer, 9 T.C. 549, 554 (1947).
2 Id. at 556.
11 Id. at 554.
34 I.R.C. § 61(a).
" Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Commissioner v. LoBue, 351
U.S. 243 (1956).
11 Lull v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 841 (1969), aff'd 434 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1970); Harris
W. Bradley, 39 T.C. 652, aff'd 324 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1963); Seth E. Keener, Jr., 59 T.C. 302
(1972); Thomas L. Karsten, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) 75, 202 (1975).
" Harris W. Bradley, 39 T.C. 652, aff'd 324 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1963).
" Id. at 654.
39 Id.
41 Id. at 655.
1981]
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declined to follow Schairer, citing the changes in the law. 4' It held that the
reimbursement was compensation and therefore taxable as income.' 2 Three
judges, in dissenting opinions, objected to the abandonment of the Schairer
rule and argued that Bradley's reimbursement for his loss on the sale of his
home was not compensation within the general principles of LoBue and
Duberstein.'"
In a subsequent case, Lull v. Commissioner,44 the petitioner tried to
distinguish his situation from the facts in Bradley in that, unlike Bradley, he
moved at the request of his current employer and not to accept new employ-
ment.' Lull attempted to revive the Schairer rule and argued that because he
had not accepted new employment, the reimbursement was merely part of the
amount realized on the sale of his house. Furthermore, he claimed it was
nonrecognizable because he had used the proceeds to purchase a new home."
The court rejected this distinction and held that taxation of the reimburse-
ment was mandated by Bradley.'7 Because the reimbursement was not part of
the amount realized on the sale, the issue of section 1034 was mooted.'"
Although the Bradley decision appears to be definitive, many taxpayers
have presented facts similar to those of Bradley and Lull in unsuccessful ef-
forts to challenge the Bradley rule. 49 In 1975 an imaginative taxpayer, with
the support of his employer, offered a new argument to avoid Bradley.0 Pur-
suant to an agreement whereby his new employer promised to reimburse him
for any loss sustained on the sale of his residence, Mr. Karsten accepted a job
offer and relocated.-" Because Karsten's efforts to sell his old home were un-
successful, his employer loaned him $50,000 to purchase a new home.2 The
11 Id. The court referred to the LoBue and Duberstein decisions.
42 Id.
41 Id. at 656-57. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
" Lull v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 841 (1969), aff'd 434 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1970).
" Id. at 848.
41 Id. at 849; I.R.C. § 1034(a): "If property ... used by the taxpayer as his principal
residence is sold by him, and, within a period beginning 18 months before the date of such sale
and ending 18 months after such date, property... is purchased and used by the taxpayer as his
principal residence, gain (if any) from such sale shall be recognized only to the extent that the
taxpayer's adjusted sales price ... of the old residence exceeds the taxpayer's cost of purchasing
the new residence."
" Lull v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 841, 849 (1969), aff'd 434 F.2d 615, 619 (9th Cir.
1970).
Id.
William A. Lull, 51 T.C. 841 (1969), aff'd 434 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1970); Owen E.
Harvey, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 67, 126 (1967), aff'd 402 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1968); Baum v. United
States, 285 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Loflin Jr. v. United States, 19 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
1091 (W.D. Tenn. 1967); Ritter v. United States, 393 F.2d 823 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
344 (1968); Seth E. Keener, Jr., 59 T.C. 302 (1972); William A. Huffman, 44 T.C.M. (P-H)
74, 108 (1974), Winston E. McNutt, 37 T.C.M. (P-H) 68, 198 (1968); John C. Burns, 36
T.C.M. (P-H) 67, 237 (1967); James D. Hayes, 35 T.C.M. (P-H) 66, 123 (1966).
Thomas L. Karsten, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) 75, 202 (1975).
Id. at 75,853.
22 Id.
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offers made on his old home were considerably less than Karsten's cost, so
Karsten persuaded his employer to purchase the home." Before the closing
of this sale, a third party made an offer on the home that was $14,000 less
than Karsten's cost but which was acceptable to his employer in light of the
promise to reimburse for loss sustained.-4 Karsten sold the home to his
employer, who immediately sold it to the third party." The employer, in con-
sideration of the sale, cancelled the loan and forwarded Karsten an amount
which represented the difference between Karsten's cost and the total of the
cancelled loan plus the outstanding mortgage balance.5 6
The Tax Court rejected Karsten's argument that his cost was the fair
market value of the home."' The court noted that the sale to the employer
was not an arm's-length transaction in that the transfer price had no
reference to the property's fair market value." Instead, the court found that
the subsequent sale to the third party was at the fair market value and that
the difference between that price and Karsten's cost was compensation to
Karsten." In effect, the court disregarded the complete transfer of the home
to the employer and concluded that the transfer, though in the form of a
sale, was merely the performance of the reimbursement guarantee condition
of the employment contract. 6
Thus, it seems that all efforts to ease an employee's relocation by assur-
ing him that he will not sustain a loss on the sale of his home are thwarted by
the Bradley rule and its extensions. No arguments have prevailed against the
Bradley rule, although they have been many and ingenious. 6"
Petitioner's Arguments
Taxpayers' arguments to avoid taxation of the home-sale loss reim-
bursement fall into three general categories. The first is the Schairer rule:
that the reimbursement is merely part of the amount realized on the sale and
therefore not compensation for services. 62 The second category includes peti-
tioners' arguments that the reimbursement is a business expense for the con-
venience of the employer; that "but for" the move, the loss would not have
been sustained, and therefore the reimbursement confers no benefit on the
employee recognizable as income. 3 The third category includes petitioner's
'3 Id. at 75,854.
54 Id.
" Id.
56 Id.
" Id. at 75,856.
" Id.
,9 Id.
60 Id.
62 See, e.g., Thomas L. Karsten, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) 75,202 (1975).
62 William A. Lull, 51 T.C. 841 (1969), aff'd 434 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1970); William A.
Huffman, 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 74, 108 (1974); John C. Bums, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 67, 237 (1967);
Owen E. Harvey, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 67, 126 (1967).
" William A. Lull, 51 T.C. 841 (1969), aff'd 434 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1970);.Ritter v.
1981]
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arguments that the reimbursement guarantee agreement is in effect a sale of
the home to the employer.'
4
Although the Bradley court rejected the Schairer rule, the case most
damning to the "amount realized" argument is Lull." In that case the peti-
tioner's reimbursement was pursuant to a formal "home guarantee policy"
of his employer, IBM. 6 The petitioner presented two arguments: first, the
IBM payments were gain from the sale of the property and, under section
1001 of the ]internal Revenue Code, constituted part of the amount realized;
second, because he had purchased a new home at a price exceeding the ad-
justed basis in the old home, the payments were eligible for nonrecognition
under section 1034 of the Internal Revenue Code."1
Strictly construing section 1001, the Tax Court analyzed the actual
transaction under which the petitioner received the payments and noted that
the reimbursement could not be a part of the amount realized because it was
not paid by the purchaser." Because the employer had not purchased the
home, the payments were made pursuant to an employment contract, not a
sales contract.69 The court found that the payments were made to secure
better services from the employee by relieving him of concern over the sale of
the home,7" and payments to secure better services represent compensation.
1
By this logic, the petitioner's section 1034 corollary argument was irrelevant:
the payments were not part of the amount realized on the sale and they were
not eligible for nonrecognitionY
The "business expense" argument is illogical and faulty because it
assumes if an expense is deductible as necessary and ordinary to the fur-
therance of a business, 7 it may not be considered income to the recipient.
The argument is premised on a federal district court decision 74 holding reim-
bursements to a taxpayer for certain living expenses and other costs incurred
as a result of having been transferred by an employer were excludable from
gross income.7 That holding was reversed, 76 and courts have continually re-
United States, 393 F.2d 823 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 844 (1968); James D. Hayes,
35 T.C.M. (P-H) 66, 123 (1966).
" Seth E. Keener, Jr., 59 T.C. 302 (1972); Thomas L. Karsten, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) 75,-
202 (1975).
61 William A. Lull, 51 T.C. 841 (1969), aff'd 434 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1970).
11 Id. at :342.
67 Id.; I.R.C. § 1001(b): "Amount Realized-The amount realized from the sale or other
disposition of property shall be the sum of money received plus the fair market value of the pro-
perty (other than money) received .... .
" William A. Lull, 51 T.C. 841, 849 (1969).
69 Id.
70 Id.
11 Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 247 (1956).
,2 William A. Lull, 51 T.C. 841, 849 (1969).
7 I.R.C. § 162(a).
4 England v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Il. 1964).
" Id. at 767.
76 England v. United States, 345 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1965).
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jected the business expense argument. 7 Indirect moving expenses are per-
sonal living expenses and as such are not deductible as business or travel
expenses.
78
The "employer purchaser" argument is, though imaginative, arguably
specious. It attempts to equate an employee's participation in an employer's
moving expense and home sale guarantee program with an equitable sale in
which the employee merely retains legal title while the employer succeeds to
the beneficial enjoyment of the incidents of ownership. 79 In Keener, the peti-
tioner was required to execute an agreement that signified his acceptance of
the terms of the reimbursement program." By signing, the petitioner agreed
to accept the appraisal made by his employer's real estate department, to for-
ward the deed to his employer, and to endorse his home insurance policies to
the employer as second interest loss payee.8" In addition, petitioner was re-
quired to list his home wvith a real estate agent acceptable to his employer and
to accept an offer only upon the employer's consent.82 If the house remained
unsold at the end of ninety days, the employer had the option to take title at
the accepted appraised value.83 The petitioner argued the home, in effect,
had been sold to the employer.8 ' His argument was based on the agreement
clause that provided for reimbursement if the home was sold for less than the
appraised value.8" Alternatively, the agreement provided if the sale was for
more than the appraised value, the excess would belong to the employer.86
The home was ultimately sold for less than the appraised value, and the
employer never exercised the option to take legal title.87 Previously the peti-
tioner had received a loan from his employer for the purchase of a new
home.88 Because the proceeds were inadequate to satisfy the loan balance
plus accrued interest, the bulk of the reimbursement was applied to cancel
the loan.89 On the petitioner's wage statement, his employer reported the dif-
ference between the appraised value and the actual sale price as compensa-
tion.9 The petitioner's accountant deducted this amount and attached to the
tax return a statement explaining that because petitioner had sold his house
to his employer, the use of the sale proceeds and reimbursement to purchase
a new home made both eligible for nonrecognition. 9
" Ritter v. United States, 393 F.2d 823, 827-29 (Ct. Cl. 1968); James D. Hayes, 35
T.C.M. (P-H) 66, 123 (1966).
78 England v. United States, 345 F.2d 414, 416 (7th Cir. 1965); I.R.C. § 262.
19 Seth E. Keener, Jr., 59 T.C. 302, 308 (1972).
Id. at 303.
88 Id.
s' Id. at 304.
83 Id. at 305.
Id. at 304.
SI Id.
86 Id.
, Id. at 306.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 306.
10 Id. at 307.
91 Id.
19811
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The petitioner argued:
The agreement entered into by Keener and INA on January 8, 1966,
constituted an absolute sale of the Harrisburg residence to INA because
under the terms of the agreement, all of the benefits and burdens of
ownership of the property passed from them to INA and petitioners re-
tained only bare legal title, which the parties intended.92
Rejecting this argument, the Tax Court held that the reimbursement was
compensation to induce Keener to move and to insure quality performance in
his new job, 9" citing Lull, Bradley, and Ritter." The court noted two
weaknesses in the petitioner's argument: (1) he had paid the taxes, utilities,
and upkeep on the home during the listing period; and (2) he could, by resign-
ing, terminate the arrangement." Thus, the courts will not find an employer-
employee sale without a transfer of legal title.
The mere transfer of legal title, however, does not provide the employee
with a safe harbor. In Karsten the court refused to recognize a sale even
though legal title had passed because the transaction was not at arm's
length;96 rather, it was made primarily for tax avoidance purposes." Keener
and Karsten imply that an arm's-length transaction between an employer and
an employee in which the employee sells his home at fair market value might
survive the scrutiny of the courts. The danger is that a subsequent sale by the
employee at a lower price to realize a loss for offsetting purposes or as a
favor to an associate might be imputed to the employee. 9'
The Effects of the Bradley Rule
There is no foolproof way an employer can help his employee avoid
the potential loss on the sale of a home incident to relocation without also
creating a potential employee tax liability. Whether there should be a nontax-
able method is debatable. The Service position that the reimbursement of the
difference between the employee's cost and the actual selling price is compen-
sation is reasonable and certainly within the logic of LoBue9" and
92 Id.
" Id. at 309-10.
9, Id. at 308-309.
11 Id. at 310.
91 Thomas L. Karsten, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) 75, 202 (1975).
,1 Id. at 75, 856.
" The editors of Prentice-Hall suggest that a sale to an employer at a reasonable price
substantiated by the appraisals of disinterested experts will minimize the risk of taxation; 2 P-H
FEDERAL TAXES 17031.1, at 7026-27 (1980), but there is no case authority behind this statement.
One Revenue Ruling, Rev. Rul. 72-339, 1972-2 C.B. 31, does suggest that the sale of a personal
residence by a transferred employee to an employer will produce gain eligible for nonrecogni-
tion, but the ruling does not discuss the parameters of a sale, i.e., when the IRS will challenge a
sale as a sham intended to avoid taxation of a loss reimbursement. Therefore, the ruling is of
little aid in the planning stage.
" Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
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Duberstein.0 0 However, a logical and reasonable characterization is not
necessarily desirable or advisable.
The Internal Revenue Code has numerous functions other than pro-
viding government revenue. One congressional use of the Code is to influence
societal behavior.1'0 Consequently, any Code section or regulation should be
analyzed not only for its potential to provide clarification and consistency to
the revenue process but also for the behavior it will encourage or discourage.
So long as a statute is constitutional, it is not the function of the courts to
pass judgment on its reasonableness. Nevertheless, the absence of grounds
for voiding a statute has seldom precluded courts from commenting on its
soundness. In analyzing the Bradley rule's clarification of section 61 of the
Internal Revenue Code, however, the courts have seemed loath to address the
underlying purposes of the rule or its effects on individual behavior.
In Schairer0 2 the Tax Court rejected the Service argument that a reim-
bursement was compensation because it determined that the employer's in-
tent was not to compensate the petitioner for services but rather to induce
him to relocate for the employer's convenience.'0 3 The court's conclusion
that the reimbursement was part of the sale transaction"' does not logically
follow from the prior conclusion concerning the employer's intent. However,
the reasoning behind the "intent analysis" has some validity and should have
received more consideration from the Bradley court.'0 Instead, the courts
have cited LoBue, Duberstein, and section 61 as inflexible mandates
precluding judicial challenge of the Bradley characterization.
If the intent of the employer were to hide a salary payment in the guise
of a loss reimbursement, then the Service argument that the payment is com-
pensation would be appropriate. The concern that an employer might use a
reimbursement guarantee as a tool to transfer dividends, bonuses, or salary
to a key employee is valid, but this concern has not been voiced in any
arguments in support of the Bradley rule. The failure to air this concern prob-
ably stems from the nature of the cases on this issue. In all the cases,
Bradley and Schairer included, the facts clearly indicate the reimbursements
are not a subterfuge but instead are sincere efforts by employers to relieve the
employee of one of the burdens of relocation. 0 6 This burden should rest on
the employer's shoulders when the transfer is for his convenience.
200 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
W. ANDREWS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 4 (1969).
202 Otto Sorg Schairer, 9 T.C. 549 (1947).
203 Id. at 555.
104 Id.
20, It seems strange that courts may impute the legal owner-employer's sale of a home to
the employee, Thomas L. Karsten, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) 75, 202 (1975), yet are unwilling to impute
the employer's reimbursement to the third party purchaser.
206 For example, in Lull, 51 T.C. 841 (1969), the reimbursement was pursuant to a non-
discriminatory moving policy available to all employees; in Huffman, 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 74,107
(1974), the reimbursement was pursuant to a Ford Motor Co. policy applicable to all employees
who moved at the request of the employer.
19811
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss2/9
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
The opinion in Schairer and the dissenting opinions in Bradley pierce
the logic of the hard and fast Bradley rule, but no court since has been will-
ing to look beyond the employer-to-employee nature of the reim-
bursement--if it smells like compensation, it must be. That an employee who
realizes only his own cost in his residence has not improved his financial posi-
tion as a result of the reimbursement is apparently irrelevant.
As a result of the Bradley rule, employees of companies with a reim-
bursement program may be presented with a Hobson's choice. This potential
impact has not been considered by any court, yet its effect on society as a
whole may be very detrimental. It is not uncommon for an employee to be
told that he can preserve his job only by relocating. Many companies have
programs to help their employees relocate by reimbursing them for moving
expenses.' 01 There is a statute that makes these expenses deductible and thus
offsets the income realized by the reimbursement.'10 But there is no deduc-
tion to offset a company's reimbursement to an employee for what may be
the greatest monetary loss sustained by a relocating employee: the loss on the
sale of a home. This problem is particularly acute at the present time when
high interest rates force many buyers out of the housing market. Thus, an
employee declining to move gives up his position and enters the job market.
An employee who elects to retain his position by moving is penalized because
lie is taxed on a payment that merely enables him to maintain his pre-
relocation financial status quo.
The Bradley rule also promotes the squandering of human talent. In the
first place, those who opt to resign are often unable to obtain equivalent
employment. Seldom will they be able to step into a new job that demands
the same level of skills utilized in their former employment.' 09 Sometimes
relocation is a condition to promotion. An employee who is offered a promo-
tion has been judged by his superiors in the business hierarchy as capable of
assuming greater responsibility or handling more technical work than was re-
quired by his former position. Yet the Bradley rule works to discourage his
acceptance. If an employee declines a promotion, not only does his employer
lose the opportunity to benefit from his talents, but society is denied the in-
cremental increase in productivity that would accompany the employee's
realization of his work potential. There are other factors, of course, which
influence an employee's decision for or against relocation."0 However, in the
107 E.g., in the cases discussed in this note alone-IBM, William A. Lull, 51 T.C. 841
(1969), aff'd 434 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1970); Ritter v. United States, 393 F.2d 823 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 844 (1968); E.R. Carpenter Co., Harris W. Bradley, 39 T.C. 652 (1963), aff'd
324 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1963); INA, Seth E. Keener, Jr., 59 T.C. 302 (1972); RCA, Otto Sorg
Shairer, 9 T.C. 549 (1947); Ford Motor Co., William A. Huffman, 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 74, 107
(1974); Insinger Machine Co., John C. Bums, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 67,237 (1967); Valeron Corp.,
Owen E. Harvey, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 67, 126 (1967); Atlas Bradford Co., James D. Hayes, 35
T.C.M. (P-H) 1 66, 123 (1966). See MANAGmmN REVIEW, July, 1980, 18 at 22.
' I.R.C. § 217.
,0, See AMERiCAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, May 1978, at 156.
11O E.g., spouse's employment, community attachments, children's education, etc.
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aggregate, the loss to society of the productivity potential of employees who
reject promotions because of the Bradley rule may well outweigh the short
term revenue benefit.
Proposed Changes
The courts are inappropriate places to consider the sociological argu-
ments against the Bradley rule. The Internal Revenue Code is statutory, and
therefore the courts are limited in what they can do to remedy an arguably
unjust characterization of home loss reimbursement as compensation. Con-
gress and the Internal Revenue Service are the proper forums. Following are
three suggestions, any of which could work to eliminate or lessen the punitive
effect of the Bradley rule on the employee and its consequential societal
detriments:
1. I.R.S. Regulation-Income: Employer's Purchase of Transferred
Employee's Principal Residence
As a minimum, the Treasury Department should issue a regulation
authorizing the treatment of the proceeds of a sale of a relocated employee's
home as amount realized if the employer purchased the home, regardless of a
subsequent sale by the employer. The regulation should, of course, be limited
to employees transferred for their employers' convenience and should require
two independent expert appraisals to determine the value of the house. Such
a regulation would eliminate the ambiguities presented by Revenue Ruling
72-329 and Karsten."'
2. I.R.S. Regulation-Income: Reimbursement Pursuant to a Home
Guarantee Program
The remedial effect of the first proposal is weakened because few
employers are financially able or willing to purchase employee homes. On the
other hand, home guarantee programs like those in the above discussed cases
are common. Consequently, an alternative regulation could provide that
reimbursement for a loss sustained on a home sale necessitated by either a
transfer for the convenience of the employer or for new employment shall be
considered part of the amount realized on the sale. A provision in the regula-
tion requiring the sale to be an arm's-length transaction could protect the
employer, as well as prevent an employee from thwarting gift tax statutes.
Further provisions could detail the form of basis substantiation necessary to
enjoy this treatment.
This proposed regulation allowing for amount realized characterization
to the basis-proceeds difference reimbursement, rather than the appraised
value-proceeds difference, would enable the employee to maintain his dollar
status quo, although not his real financial position (inasmuch as inflation
may have altered the value of his invested dollars). An alternative. would be
I Thomas L. Karsten, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) 75, 202 (1975).
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to grant this characterization to the reimbursement for the appraised value-
proceeds difference. This alternative would allow the employee to realize his
appreciation despite the imposition of a relocation time deadline by the
employer because the employee would not be forced to adjust his price
downward for a quick sale. A provision that the appraisals be made by inde-
pendent expert appraisers would be appropriate. Both provisions could be
adopted as alternative options allowing the employee to avoid the vagaries of
a fluctuating economy.
3. Code Section: Deduction of Loss on Sale of Principal Residence
Conditioned on Reinvestment of Any Employer Reimbursement
Congress could enact a new code section similar to section 217 of the
Internal Revenue Code."' The section would create a deduction for the loss
on the sale of a principal residence sustained by a person relocating to obtain
or to continue employment. The section's application could be conditioned
on several factors:
a. That the distance and durational requirements of section 217'1' be
met;
b. That the relocation be for the convenience of the employer;
c. That any reimbursement from the employer for this loss be
reported as ordinary income and also be used for the purchase of a
new principal residence within three months of the sale of the old
principal residence;
d. That the home purchased must equal or exceed in price the total of
the proceeds from the sale of the prior residence plus the reim-
bursement;
e. That the amount of the deduction and reimbursement eligible for
section 1034 treatment not exceed the difference between the
average value of the residence as determined by not less than two
nor more than four independent expert appraisers and the net sell-
ing price of the residence in an arm's-length transaction; and
f. That if the employee is reimbursed by his employer and does elect
to take the deduction by using the reimbursement to purchase a
new residence, his basis in the new residence shall be the price of
the new home less the amount of the reimbursement, i.e., section
1034 treatment of the reimbursement.
This section would represent a compromise between the Schairer rule
and the Bradley rule. A person who is not reimbursed by his employer would
not be penalized by his employer's decision to transfer the employee because
the deduction would still be available to help defray a loss. A person who
112 I.R.C. § 217 provides that certain moving expenses are deductible.
"I To be eligible for the deduction, a person's new place of employment must be at least
35 miles farther from his former residence than was his old place of employment and he must
work full time at the new job for 39 consecutive weeks in the next 12 months. I.R.C. § 217(c).
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does not elect to purchase a new residence would receive no deduction and
his reimbursement would be characterized.as ordinary income. A person who
elects to purchase a new residence would not be immediately taxed on the
reimbursement but would instead be able to defer that tax until a subsequent
residence sale without a rollover of the proceeds into a new residence.
Conclusion
A person who must sell his personal residence in order to obtain or to
continue employment is often backed into a comer by the Internal Revenue
Code as it is now construed. Frequently, he must take a loss on the sale,
either because he has a limited time in which to complete the sale and report
to work, or because the market is deflated at the time he must sell. The Inter-
nal Revenue Code designates this a noncasualty personal loss for which there
is no deduction,"" even though the pressure to move is applied by his
employer. If the employer reimburses the employee, the Bradley rule
characterizes the reimbursement as ordinary income.115
Unless the employee receives a substantial salary increase for moving,
the inflated price of homes, the inability to avoid immediate taxation on the
reimbursement, and the loss on the sale of the home combine to present him
with an unenviable choice: he may increase his level of personal indebtedness
to purchase a new residence of comparable value; he may purchase a
residence of lesser value; or he may elect not to purchase a new home. In
effect, the Service's taxation of the reimbursement denies the employee the
opportunity to realize the full appreciation in the value of his home and
reinvest this appreciation in a new residence without taxation.
Section 1034 of the Internal Revenue Code allows others who sell their
homes to reinvest the realized appreciation without immediate taxation. Con-
sequently, a person who relocates at the request (or demand) of his employer
is penalized. This should not be a result of the Code. There is no doubt that
Bradley is consistent with the earlier cases of LoBue and Duberstein, which
define income. Perhaps Congress should recognize that this definition often
spawns injustices and should set more definite parameters on the definition.
One such delineation should involve the reimbursement by an employer to an.
employee of the loss sustained on the sale of the employee's residence when
he is required to relocate to preserve his job.
Douglas M. Rather
'" I.R.C. § 165(c)(3).
"t Harris W. Bradley, 39 T.C. 652, 655 (1963).
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